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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Defendant-appellants Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and 
the Bucks County Correctional Facility bring this interlocutory 
appeal of the District Court’s May 4, 2016 order certifying a 
class to pursue claims against them brought by plaintiff-appellee 
Daryoush Taha, the class representative.  In 2011, defendants 
created a publicly searchable “Inmate Lookup Tool” into which 
they uploaded information about tens of thousands of people 
who had been held or incarcerated at the Bucks County 
Correctional Facility since 1938.  Taha subsequently filed suit 
against the defendants who are appellants on this appeal, and to 
whom we are referring when we use the term “defendants,” and 
certain other defendants that we need not identify alleging that 
they had publicly disseminated information on the internet in 
violation of the Pennsylvania Criminal History Record 
Information Act (“CHRIA”), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9102 et seq., 
about his expunged 1998 arrest and incarceration in Bucks 
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County.  The Court granted Taha’s motion for partial summary 
judgment on liability on March 28, 2016, before certifying a 
plaintiffs’ punitive damages class of individuals about whom 
information of their incarceration had been disseminated online. 
 At that time the Court found that the only remaining question of 
fact was whether defendants had acted willfully in disseminating 
the information.  After the Court certified the class by order of 
May 4, 2016, we granted defendants permission on July 5, 2016, 
to bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f). 
 Defendants claim that the District Court erred in granting 
Taha partial summary judgment on liability before ruling on his 
motion seeking class certification.  They also assert that the 
Court erred on a number of grounds in certifying a punitive 
damages class.  In this regard, defendants challenge Taha’s 
standing, the Court’s holding that punitive damages can be 
imposed in a case in which the plaintiff does not recover 
compensatory damages, the Court’s holding that punitive 
damages can be imposed on government agencies, and the 
Court’s finding that the predominance requirement under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) had been met so that a 
class could be certified.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the Court’s May 4, 2016 order granting class action 
certification. 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History 
 On September 29, 1998, the police in Bensalem 
Township in Bucks County arrested Taha and charged him with 
harassment, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest.  J.A. at 
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972a.  After his arrest, the police transported him to the Bucks 
County Correctional Facility, where his booking photo was 
taken, and where he was held for several hours before his 
release.  Id. at 823a-25a.   
 In the ensuing criminal proceedings, all counts except for 
one were dismissed.  Though Taha maintained his innocence on 
the remaining count he agreed to participate in an Alternative 
Rehabilitative Disposition program for its resolution.  See id. at 
963a.  When Taha completed the program a year later, the Court 
of Common Pleas of Bucks County issued an order directing the 
expungement of Taha’s “arrest record and other criminal 
records.”  Id. at 964a-65a.  In May and June 2000, the Bensalem 
Township Police Department, the Pennsylvania State Police 
Central Repository, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation all 
confirmed that Taha’s record had been expunged.  Id. at 970a-
74a. 
 Over a decade later in January 2011, defendants created a 
public “Inmate Lookup Tool” on the internet using information 
from their Offender Management System.  Id. at 578a-79a.  This 
database contained information on both current and former 
inmates at the Bucks County Correctional Facility.  Id. at 1386a. 
 Information was published online between January 2011 and 
June 2013 about individuals who had been held or incarcerated 
at the Bucks County Correctional Facility from 1938 onward, a 
total of 66,799 people.1  Id. at 422a, 1381a-86a. 
                                                 
1  Defendants ceased uploading arrest and incarceration 
information in this format in June 2013 and changed their 
inmate lookup tool in August 2013 to include only an inmate’s 
name, date of birth, and correctional facility ID number.  J.A. at 
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The information on Taha uploaded onto this publicly 
available online search tool included his color booking 
photograph from the shoulders up, sex, date of birth, height, 
weight, race, hair color, eye color, citizenship, date of his 
commission to the facility, date of his release from the facility, 
case number for the offense charged, and “DC, HARASS” as 
the charge information.  Id. at 949a-50a.  The uploaded 
information listed his “current location” as the “MAIN” facility 
in “BUCKS COUNTY.”  Id. at 949a.  There were also several 
unfilled fields, including those for marital status, FBI number, 
state ID, alias information, detainer information, and the grade, 
date, and degree of offense.  Id. at 949a-50a.  The above 
uploading did not complete the dissemination of information 
about Taha as a number of private companies that crawl the 
internet to collect photographs and data found Taha’s 
photograph and other information about him and republished it 
on their websites.2  Id. at 1078a-79a, 1081a-83a, 1785a. 
Taha discovered in the fall of 2011 that information 
about his several hours of incarceration at the Bucks County 
Correctional Facility in 1998 was publicly accessible on the 
internet despite the expungement of his record.  Id. at 731a-33a. 
 Taha and his wife claim that they both expressed sadness, 
frustration, outrage, and embarrassment over the availability of 
the expunged arrest information online.  Id. at 727a-31a.  Taha 
                                                                                                             
1386a-88a. 
 
2  Taha included some of these companies as defendants but the 
only defendants with whom we are concerned are Bucks County 
and the Bucks County Correctional Facility.  The companies use 
photographs and data about arrest records to collect revenue or 
charge fees for the removal of the data.  See J.A. at 1655a-68a. 
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testified at a deposition that his mother stated that his arrest and 
incarceration were “shameful” and that he had “tarnish[ed] the 
family name.”  Id. at 747a.  He also testified to losing weight 
and having difficulty sleeping after he discovered the 
information on the internet.  Id. at 794a-96a.  He was concerned 
that his previous employers or prospective future employers 
might see this information.  Id. at 799a-800a.  But Taha does not 
claim that he suffered any pecuniary loss as a result of the 
publication of his booking photograph and the other 
information. 
B.  Procedural History 
 Taha filed his suit on December 12, 2012, under section 
9121 of CHRIA seeking injunctive relief and actual and punitive 
damages under CHRIA section 9183 against defendants based 
on the internet release of his “criminal history record 
information” stemming from his expunged 1998 arrest.  After 
several years of litigation, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  On March 28, 2016, the District Court 
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granted 
Taha’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability under 
CHRIA.  Defendants subsequently moved to certify the order 
entered on the motions for summary judgment for interlocutory 
appeal but the Court denied that motion and granted a motion 
that Taha filed for class certification on his punitive damages 
claim on May 4, 2016.  The Court certified a class composed of 
“[a]ll persons whose criminal history record information was 
made available on the BCCF Inmate Lookup Tool.”  Id. at 12a.   
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III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Taha’s action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  On July 5, 2016, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), we 
granted defendants’ motion to allow an interlocutory appeal of 
the class certification order.  Thus, we have jurisdiction to 
consider defendants’ appeal. 
“We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision ‘rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of 
law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 Defendants challenge the District Court’s class 
certification order on both procedural and substantive grounds.  
First, they maintain that the Court erred by granting Taha’s 
motion for partial summary judgment on liability prior to 
deciding Taha’s motion seeking class certification.  Second, they 
challenge the certification decision.  Taha responds that 
defendants waived their argument about the order of the Court’s 
decisions and that defendants’ substantive contentions are 
incorrect.  Taha also argues that the Court did not abuse its 
discretion in certifying a class for the purpose of determining 
whether defendants acted “willfully” in violating CHRIA to the 
end that defendants could be subject to punitive damages. 
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A.  One-Way Intervention 
 Defendants first claim that the District Court procedurally 
erred when it granted Taha’s motion for partial summary 
judgment before it ruled on Taha’s motion for class certification. 
 Defendants argue that the Court’s order of decision-making 
violated the rule against one-way intervention dealing with the 
availability of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 after the merits of a case have been decided.  The 
Supreme Court has outlined the history and reasoning behind the 
rule against one-way intervention: 
Rule 23 as it stood prior to its extensive 
amendment in 1966 . . . contained no mechanism 
for determining at any point in advance of final 
judgment which of those potential members of the 
class claimed in the complaint were actual 
members and would be bound by the judgment.  
Rather, ‘[w]hen a suit was brought by or against 
such a class, it was merely an invitation to joinder 
— an invitation to become a fellow traveler in the 
litigation, which might or might not be accepted.’ 
 A recurrent source of abuse under the former 
Rule lay in the potential that members of the 
claimed class could in some situations await 
developments in the trial or even final judgment 
on the merits in order to determine whether 
participation would be favorable to their interests. 
 If the evidence at the trial made their prospective 
position as actual class members appear weak, or 
if a judgment precluded the possibility of a 
favorable determination, such putative members 
of the class who chose not to intervene or join as 
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parties would not be bound by the judgment.  This 
situation — the potential for so-called ‘one-way 
intervention’ — aroused considerable criticism 
upon the ground that it was unfair to allow 
members of a class to benefit from a favorable 
judgment without subjecting themselves to the 
binding effect of an unfavorable one.  The 1966 
amendments were designed, in part, specifically 
to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule 
and to assure that members of the class would be 
identified before trial on the merits and would be 
bound by all subsequent orders and judgments. 
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 545-47, 94 S.Ct. 
756, 762-63 (1974) (footnotes and citations omitted).   
The 1966 amendments changed Rule 23 to state that a 
decision on class certification was to be made “as soon as 
practicable after commencement of an action.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(c)(1) (1966).  But in 2003, Rule 23 was again amended to 
state that any class certification decision should be made “[a]t an 
early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  This is the 
standard today. 
Taha argues that defendants never raised the rule against 
one-way intervention in the District Court or challenged the 
order of the District Court’s decision-making process.  
Appellee’s br. at 29-30.  Thus, Taha argues, defendants have 
waived their one-way intervention argument.  Id.  He claims that 
defendants “actively participated in the process by which cross 
motions for summary judgment were submitted to the District 
Court for adjudication, without any objection.”  Id. at 30. 
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 Defendants point to citations in the record that they 
contend indicate that they raised the issues that they now raise 
on appeal in the District Court but the references do not make 
any mention of the rule against one-way intervention, let alone 
include any objection to the Court’s decision-making order.  
Defendants claim that they could not have “reasonably 
expected” that the Court would have ruled on the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment before it decided whether to 
grant class certification and they therefore should not be faulted 
for not raising the one-way intervention issue in that Court.  
Appellants’ reply br. at 4. 
 “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, issues not raised 
before the district court are waived on appeal.”  Fletcher-Harlee 
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Yet we agree with defendants that they could not 
have been “prescient,” as they put it, and predicted that the 
District Court would have ruled on the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment prior to deciding whether to grant class 
action certification.  See Appellants’ reply br. at 7.  However, 
defendants submitted two post-decision motions to that Court.  
First, after the Court ruled on the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment on March 28, 2016, defendants filed a 
motion for reconsideration on April 11, 2016, in which they did 
not mention the one-way intervention issue or the Court’s 
decision-making order, even though the class certification 
motion still was pending.  The Court then held a hearing on the 
class certification motion on April 15, 2016, during which, so 
far as we can ascertain, defendants did not object to the order of 
the proceedings.  Second, after the Court ruled on the class 
certification issue on May 4, 2016, defendants filed a motion to 
certify the summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal 
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without suggesting that they had objected to the District Court’s 
order when making its decisions.  Overall, it is clear that 
defendants had multiple opportunities to raise the one-way 
intervention issue in the District Court but failed to do so.   
 Defendants argue that because we have discretion to 
address issues even if not raised in a district court, we should 
consider the one-way intervention question.  They rely on two 
cases to support their position but both are distinguishable from 
this case.  Appellants’ reply br. at 8.  First, in Bagot v. Ashcroft, 
we entertained a plaintiff’s argument that he had not raised in 
the district court but did so because it was “a pure question of 
law, and one that [was] closely related to arguments that [the 
plaintiff] did raise in that court.”  398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 
2005).  In Bagot the stakes were very high, as the failure to 
address the argument “would result in the substantial injustice of 
deporting an American citizen.”  Id.  Then in Huber v. Taylor, 
we found that a choice of law issue had not been waived when 
the district court had overlooked the issue even though it was 
“inherent in the parties’ positions throughout th[e] case,” which 
the district court could see from the parties’ consistent citations 
to different state laws in their briefs.  469 F.3d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
In contrast to the parties in Bagot and Huber, defendants 
in this case appear not to have made even a passing or indirect 
mention of the one-way intervention issue in the District Court 
either before or after the Court made its decisions on summary 
judgment and class certification.  Furthermore, the one-way 
intervention issue is unrelated to the other arguments that 
defendants advanced in that Court.  It is clear that they had 
numerous opportunities to inform that Court that they took issue 
with the order in which the Court was making its decisions but 
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they never did so.  Thus, this case is not a rare case in which we 
will exercise our discretion to entertain an issue initially raised 
on appeal. 
B.  Class Certification Decision 
 Next, defendants argue that the District Court abused its 
discretion in certifying a class solely for the purpose of 
determining whether punitive damages should be imposed 
against them.  They claim that Taha does not have Article III 
standing or “aggrieved” party standing as CHRIA requires.  
They maintain that the District Court erred in certifying the 
punitive damages class where the class representing Taha had 
not suffered compensatory damages.  They contend that CHRIA 
does not permit the imposition of punitive damages on 
government agencies because CHRIA does not contain a 
targeted waiver of sovereign immunity.  Finally, they argue that 
the Court erred in finding that the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
factor was met because, in their view, the determination of the 
amount of punitive damages depends on the impact on class 
members by the disclosure of their CHRIA-protected 
information.  Taha contests all of these points and maintains that 
the Court properly certified the punitive damages class.3 
                                                 
3  Taha also contends that defendants waived their Rule 23 
arguments, other than the argument addressing the 
predominance factor, because they did not raise these arguments 
when opposing the motion for class certification.  However, 
unlike defendants’ one-way intervention argument, which 
defendants did not raise even in passing at any point before the 
District Court, defendants did raise all of their other arguments 
at various times before that Court and we thus will consider 
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 For the reasons that follow, we determine that Taha has 
both Article III and statutory “aggrieved” party standing.  We 
conclude that the District Court did not err in holding that, under 
CHRIA, in certain circumstances punitive damages may be 
imposed against a defendant even though the plaintiff does not 
recover compensatory damages from that defendant.  
Furthermore, CHRIA on its face permits punitive damages to be 
imposed on government agencies.  Finally, we hold that the 
Court properly determined that common questions predominate 
over individual questions in the case so that the predominance 
aspect of Rule 23 has been met.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s class certification order of May 4, 2016, in all 
respects. 
1.  Article III Standing 
 Defendants maintain that Taha lacks Article III standing 
because the District Court found that he had not suffered 
compensatory damages attributable to the dissemination of the 
expunged information in violation of CHRIA.4  Specifically, 
they contest Taha’s ability to show that he suffered an “injury in 
fact” as required to establish standing.  See Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) 
(stating that “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
                                                                                                             
them. 
 
4  This issue is within the limited scope of defendants’ Rule 
23(f) appeal because we consider “Article III standing as a 
necessary threshold issue to our review” of a class certification 
order.  McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
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contains three elements,” the first of which is that “the plaintiff 
must have suffered ‘an injury in fact’”). 
“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he 
or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that 
is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.’”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 
1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 
2136).  But the Supreme Court has emphasized that an 
intangible injury may be sufficiently concrete so that its redress 
will satisfy the injured party’s standing requirement.  Id. at 1549. 
We have applied this principle.  See In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied sub nom. C. A. F. v. Viacom Inc., 137 S.Ct. 624 (2017) 
(mem.).  In Nickelodeon, we held that the plaintiffs — who had 
alleged a “perhaps intangible” harm when their legally protected 
information was unlawfully disclosed on the internet — had 
pled facts sufficient to establish Article III standing.5  Id. at 273-
74 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Google Inc. 
Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 134-
35 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Gourley v. Google, 
Inc., 137 S.Ct. 36 (2016) (mem.) (finding that plaintiffs had 
shown injury in fact when they made “highly specific allegations 
that the defendants, in the course of serving advertisements to 
their personal web browsers, implanted tracking cookies on their 
personal computers,” explaining that “[t]o the extent that the 
defendants believe[d] that the alleged conduct implicate[d] 
                                                 
5  The information allegedly included data collected from minors 
accessing the internet, such as children’s genders, birthdates, 
browser settings, IP addresses, and web communications.  
Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 269. 
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interests that are not legally protected, this is an issue of the 
merits rather than of standing”).  We have stated that focusing 
on “economic loss” in determining whether a plaintiff has 
Article III standing is “misplaced.”  Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 
272-73 (quoting Google, 806 F.3d at 134). 
We are satisfied that Taha has shown for standing 
purposes that he suffered an injury in fact.  Like the plaintiffs in 
Nickelodeon and Google, he claims to have been “intangibly” 
but personally and actually injured when his arrest information 
and booking photograph were publicly disseminated.  He 
testified in a deposition that he suffered from humiliation, 
sadness, and embarrassment as a result of the posting; and lost 
sleep and weight after he discovered the listing.  Regardless of 
the ultimate outcome on the class’s punitive damage claim, Taha 
has claimed a sufficiently particularized and concrete injury to 
demonstrate that he has Article III standing. 
 2.  “Aggrieved” Standing 
 Defendants next argue that Taha was not “aggrieved” as 
the CHRIA statutory scheme requires to recover damages and 
therefore that he is not an appropriate class representative.  See 
Appellants’ br. at 21 (arguing that if Taha “is not ‘aggrieved’ . . 
. [he] is not entitled to maintain a punitive damages claim under 
CHRIA even on behalf of himself, much less a class of 66,799 
offenders”). 
 CHRIA requires that a person be “aggrieved” to recover 
compensatory damages under the statute but it does not specify 
the injuries that can cause actual and real damages.  See 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9183(b)(2) (providing that “[a] person found by the 
court to have been aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or the 
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rules or regulations promulgated under this chapter” can receive 
certain forms of relief).  However, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has held that “[a] party is aggrieved if he can demonstrate 
that he has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the 
outcome of the litigation.”  Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City 
Council of Phila., 928 A.2d 1255, 1265-66 (Pa. 2007).  As that 
court has explained: 
A ‘substantial’ interest is an interest in the 
outcome of the litigation which surpasses the 
common interest of all citizens in procuring 
obedience to the law.  A ‘direct’ interest requires 
a showing that the matter complained of caused 
harm to the party’s interest.  An ‘immediate’ 
interest involves the nature of the causal 
connection between the action complained of and 
the injury to the party challenging it. 
 
In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003) (citation 
omitted).   
But the Pennsylvania court has not required that this 
interest be pecuniary.  Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 281 (Pa. 1975) (“[I]t is clear that 
some interests will suffice to confer standing even though they 
are neither pecuniary nor readily translatable into pecuniary 
terms.”).  Defendants do not satisfactorily explain why Taha 
fails to have a “substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the 
outcome of the litigation” beyond their arguments in the Article 
III standing context.  Taha makes a plausible argument that 
defendants caused him to suffer harm unique to him rather than 
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causing general harm common to all individuals after defendants 
released information about his expunged arrest.  Moreover, Taha 
asserts that there was a causal connection between defendants’ 
actions and his harm.  Thus, Taha has sufficiently pleaded that 
he has been aggrieved under CHRIA to serve as a class 
representative. 
 3. Availability of Punitive Damages Without                 
           Compensatory Damages 
 The parties disagree on the answer to the question of 
whether the District Court could certify a class for punitive 
damages after it found that the class representative was not 
entitled to compensatory damages.  In certifying the class, the 
Court concluded that the only question left in the case was a 
class-wide question about “the County Defendants’ willfulness” 
in its actions violating CHRIA because Taha did not have a 
valid claim for “actual and real damages.”  J.A. at 9a.  Thus, the 
Court premised its class certification decision on its holding that 
Taha could recover punitive damages even though he could not 
recover compensatory damages. 
 When the District Court held that punitive damages could 
be imposed under CHRIA even though Taha had not suffered 
compensatory damages, it relied on a Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court case which addressed “whether punitive damages must 
bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages which 
are awarded.”  Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 
800, 801 (Pa. 1989).  In addressing this question, the Kirkbride 
court explained that although “punitive damages must, by 
necessity, be related to the injury-producing cause of action[,] 
[t]his does not mean . . . that specific compensatory damages 
must be awarded to sustain a punitive damages award.”  Id. at 
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802.  In a case where “compensatory damages had not been 
awarded, punitive damages could be appropriate, the critical 
factor being the establishment of sufficient evidence to sustain 
the cause of action.”  Id. at 803. 
 The court in Kirkbride distinguished its prior opinion in 
Hilbert v. Roth, 149 A.2d 648 (Pa. 1959), in which a plaintiff 
was unsuccessful when he “attempted to pursue an independent 
cause of action for punitive damages since the cause of action 
for compensatory damages had been dismissed.”  Id. at 802.  
The Kirkbride court observed that in Hilbert there was “no cause 
of action upon which the plaintiff could claim punitive 
damages” after “the underlying cause of action was dismissed.”6 
                                                 
6  In all the Pennsylvania state court cases which defendants cite 
to refute the theory that punitive damages can be recovered in 
the absence of compensatory damages, there was not a cause of 
action supporting the recovery of punitive damages alone.  See 
Smith v. Grab, 705 A.2d 894, 901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (finding 
that although a punitive damages issue was not “ripe for 
review,” “the entry of a nonsuit [against the plaintiff] by the trial 
court precluded the recovery of compensatory damages; thus, 
punitive damages were foreclosed as well” because the plaintiff 
did not have a remaining cause of action on which to rely); 
Schecter v. Watkins, 577 A.2d 585, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(stating that where the jury entered a “verdict of non-liability” 
for the defendants and accordingly “no actual damages [were] 
sustained,” punitive damages could not be recovered because 
they “must arise out of liability on the cause of action” and be 
“an element of damages flowing therefrom”).  
 
Defendants cite our opinion in Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1991), rendered after 
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 Id.  It contrasted this scenario with one in which “liability was 
determined on the facts and [solely] punitive damages were 
awarded predicated upon the finding of liability.”  Id. 
 In considering the relevant statutory language in this case 
we build on our understanding that, under Pennsylvania law, a 
court may impose punitive damages even if the plaintiff has not 
suffered compensatory damages provided that there is a cause of 
action to support the imposition of punitive damages.  The civil 
penalties section of CHRIA states that: 
A person found by the court to have been 
aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or the 
rules or regulations promulgated under this 
chapter, shall be entitled to actual and real 
damages of not less than $100 for each violation 
and to reasonable costs of litigation and attorney’s 
fees.  Exemplary and punitive damages of not less 
than $1,000 nor more than $10,000 shall be 
imposed for any violation of this chapter, or the 
rules or regulations adopted under this chapter, 
found to be willful. 
§ 9183(b)(2).  Unlike in other cases in which courts must 
grapple with the question of whether there can be a cause of 
action for punitive damages, CHRIA provides for the imposition 
                                                                                                             
Kirkbride to support their position.  Appellants’ reply br. at 24.  
However, Tunis’ limited mention of this issue included a 
citation to a 1984 case, Emerick v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 
750 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1984), that relied on Hilbert, which 
Kirkbride distinguished.  See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, 
Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. 1989). 
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of punitive damages without any explicit language linking the 
imposition of punitive damages to the recovery of actual and 
real damages.  Although any underlying cause of action to 
support imposition of punitive damages has as an element the 
presence of an aggrieved plaintiff — a threshold standing 
requirement — as well as a violation of the statute and, for the 
imposition of punitive damages, a finding of a defendant’s 
willfulness, the plain statutory language does not condition the 
imposition of punitive damages on a plaintiff’s recovery of 
compensatory damages. 
Defendants argue that it would be “absurd” for at least 
$1,000 in punitive damages to be imposed, the minimum 
recovery for punitive damages under CHRIA for a CHRIA 
willful violation, inasmuch as the District Court already has 
found that Taha is not entitled to any actual and real damages 
for the violation, not even the statutory minimum amount of 
$100.7  Appellants’ br. at 21, 24-25.  They argue that such an 
                                                 
7  In their reply brief, defendants rely extensively on an 
interpretation of the federal Privacy Act by the Supreme Court 
to support this point, but the case they cite involved a different 
question from the one before us.  See Appellants’ reply br. at 
16-18 (citing FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 132 S.Ct. 1441 
(2012)).  In Cooper, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Privacy Act allowed the recovery of damages for mental and 
emotional distress under the Act’s “actual damages” provision, 
holding that it did not.  566 U.S. at 304, 132 S.Ct. at 1456.  It 
did not address punitive damages, let alone the availability of 
statutory punitive damages when a plaintiff has suffered mental 
and emotional harm without accompanying “actual and real” 
damages under a statute like CHRIA. 
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interpretation would be contrary to legislative intent, although 
they do not cite any relevant legislative history or evidence 
specifically about the purpose of CHRIA to support their 
argument.  See id. at 23-25. 
 Taha responds that CHRIA plainly shows that even 
though it could have done so, the Pennsylvania legislature did 
not condition the imposition of punitive damages under CHRIA 
on the plaintiff’s recovery of compensatory damages.  
Appellee’s br. at 45.  Taha also notes that the District Court has 
not yet determined what action constitutes a “violation” of 
CHRIA — each individual internet posting, the single decision 
to upload the information, or some other action or actions.  Id. at 
46-47.  At oral argument on Taha’s motion for class 
certification, the District Court suggested that it was possible 
that “the decision to put all the records on the lookup tool was 
one violation.”  J.A. at 2174a.  While defendants and their 
supporting amicus curiae make dire predictions about the 
potential financial burdens on Pennsylvania taxpayers from the 
class certification, these arguments are premature as the District 
Court has not made any decision regarding what conduct 
constitutes a violation or violations.8   
                                                 
8  The amicus curiae brief filed by the County Commissioners 
Association of Pennsylvania (“CCAP”) presents some potential 
calculations of a punitive damages range, based on assumptions 
it makes about what would constitute a “violation” of CHRIA in 
this case.  See CCAP Amicus Curiae br. at 7-9.  Nevertheless, 
we are confident that even if the class is successful in advancing 
its contention that punitive damages should be imposed on 
defendants, the District Court or this Court on appeal will apply 
CHRIA so that any punitive damages imposed would be 
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 Punitive damages serve a different purpose than 
compensatory damages inasmuch as in the tort context, they 
generally are imposed “to punish . . . for outrageous conduct and 
to deter . . . from similar conduct.”  Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison 
v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005).  In the penalties 
provision of CHRIA, the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly 
provided for the imposition of punitive damages without 
including any language making the recovery of compensatory 
damages a prerequisite for their imposition.  Because punitive 
damages are imposed for a different purpose than compensatory 
damages, we cannot say that it would be “absurd” or 
“unreasonable,” as defendants suggest, to read the statute to 
permit the imposition of punitive damages in the absence of 
compensatory damages so long as there is a cause of action to 
support the imposition of punitive damages. 
 Given the particular harms that can be wrought by the 
release of someone’s criminal history information, there may be 
instances in which an individual faces consequences beyond 
humiliation and embarrassment which may be difficult or 
impossible to evaluate in monetary terms.  See Community 
Legal Services Amicus Curiae br. at 7, 14 (outlining how 
“[i]ndividuals are routinely denied employment, housing, and 
education opportunities due to their criminal records, however 
minor they may be,” and suffer adverse treatment by entities or 
individuals who rely on “non-conviction data”).  CHRIA on its 
face permits the imposition of punitive damages on defendants 
who willfully cause this type of harm.  Thus, we cannot 
                                                                                                             
reasonable.  After all, the Pennsylvania legislature cannot have 
intended to provide for the imposition of unreasonable punitive 
damages.  In any event, the question of how damages under 
CHIRA are calculated and allocated is not before us. 
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conclude that the District Court erred when it based its class 
certification order on its conclusion that punitive damages could 
be imposed under CHRIA even if Taha could not recover 
compensatory damages. 
 4.  Availability of Punitive Damages Against                
           Government Agencies 
 Defendants also argue that inasmuch as they are 
government agencies, the District Court erred when it certified a 
punitive damages class that could proceed against them.  
Appellants’ br. at 35-41.  The Court did not address this issue 
when making its class action certification decision.  But the 
Court earlier had considered whether punitive damages could be 
imposed on a government agency when the Court addressed the 
summary judgment motions for at that time it relied on its prior 
conclusion on a motion to dismiss that CHRIA authorizes the 
imposition of damages against government agencies.  It 
therefore held that CHRIA includes a legislatively targeted 
waiver of sovereign immunity.  See J.A. at 23a-24a.  The Court 
reasoned that: 
[T]here is no precedent for the proposition that 
punitive damages imposed pursuant to CHRIA are 
inapplicable to state agencies. . . .  As discussed at 
length in Taha I, several Pennsylvania courts have 
also held or assumed that CHRIA provides for 
damages against governmental units.  Thus, this 
Court predicted in Taha I that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would find that CHRIA 
‘demonstrates a clear legislative intent to hold 
government entities liable for damages for 
violation of section 9121.’  Without further 
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guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court . . 
. this prediction is unchanged. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The status of this case requires us to 
address the question of whether punitive damages can be 
imposed on a government agency in order to determine whether, 
depending on the facts of the case, it would be proper to certify 
a class solely for the purpose of potentially imposing punitive 
damages on such agencies under CHRIA. 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that as a 
general rule, “government agencies have been exempt from the 
imposition of punitive damages.”  Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Pa. 1986).  Punitive damages 
generally are prohibited “unless expressly authorized by statute.” 
 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 260 n.21, 
101 S.Ct. 2748, 2756 n.21 (1981). 
 Defendants argue that CHRIA does not include a 
sufficiently “express” authorization for punitive damages to be 
imposed against government agencies.  They argue that CHRIA 
lacks such authorization because each section of CHRIA does 
not include its own penalties provision stating that punitive 
damages may be imposed for a violation of that provision but 
CHRIA includes only a separate penalties provision.  They also 
argue that the penalties provision does not expressly allow 
punitive damages to be imposed on a government agency. 
 We disagree.  On its face, CHRIA applies to “persons 
within this Commonwealth and to any agency of the 
Commonwealth or its political subdivisions which collects, 
maintains, disseminates or receives criminal history record 
information.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9103.  Although the statute 
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does not define an “agency,” it states that 
[c]riminal justice agencies include, but are not 
limited to: organized State and municipal police 
departments, local detention facilities, county, 
regional and State correctional facilities, 
probation agencies, district or prosecuting 
attorneys, parole boards, pardon boards, the 
facilities and administrative offices of the 
Department of Public Welfare that provide care, 
guidance and control to adjudicated delinquents, 
and such agencies or subunits thereof, as are 
declared by the Attorney General to be criminal 
justice agencies as determined by a review of 
applicable statutes and the State and Federal 
Constitutions or both. 
Id. § 9102 (emphasis added).  It is difficult to understand how a 
more expansive definition of a criminal justice agency could be 
written. 
The majority of CHRIA’s provisions govern the conduct 
of government agencies in relation to the collection, 
management, use, or dissemination of criminal history record 
information.9  See, e.g., id. §§ 9111, 9113-14, 9121, 9124, 9131, 
9141, 9171.  Section 9181 of CHRIA provides that “[a]ny 
person, including any agency or organization, who violates the 
                                                 
9  There are exceptions to these rules in sections governing the 
use of criminal records by employers and the right of an 
individual to access and review information about the 
individual’s own criminal history record.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 9125, 9151, 9153. 
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provisions of this chapter or any regulations or rules 
promulgated under it may . . . [b]e subject to civil penalties or 
other remedies as provided for in this chapter.”  This language 
does not limit CHRIA’s available remedies to situations in 
which there have been violations of only certain of its 
provisions.  As we quoted above in relevant part, CHRIA’s civil 
penalties provision states that “[a] person found by the court to 
have been aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or the rules or 
regulations promulgated under this chapter” can recover “actual 
and real damages” and possibly “[e]xemplary and punitive 
damages,” if they are imposed.  Id. § 9183. 
 The section under which Taha brought his suit — section 
9121 — provides that “[c]riminal history record information 
shall be disseminated by a State or local police department to 
any individual or noncriminal justice agency only upon request.” 
 It states that before any information is disseminated, certain 
information must be removed from the record; specifically, 
“[a]ll notations of arrests, indictments or other information 
relating to the initiation of criminal proceedings where: (A) 
three years have elapsed from the date of arrest; (B) no 
conviction has occurred; and (C) no proceedings are pending 
seeking a conviction” as well as “[a]ll information relating to a 
conviction and the arrest, indictment or other information . . . 
which is the subject of a court order for limited access.”  Id. § 
9121(b)(2).   
But section 9121 does not contain limitations indicating 
that “any agency or organization” found in violation of that 
provision, per section 9181, would not be subject to the 
expressly outlined penalties imposed under section 9183.10  To 
                                                 
10  Defendants argue that section 9121 of CHRIA does not 
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the contrary, the clear language of the statute, read in its entirety, 
indicates that the Pennsylvania legislature intended individuals 
to be able to recover damages, possibly including punitive 
damages, against government entities willfully violating 
CHRIA.  We need not look beyond this language to make this 
determination inasmuch as defendants do not provide us with 
persuasive authority to the contrary.11 
                                                                                                             
include an express waiver of sovereign immunity for the 
purposes of imposing punitive damages on government entities 
because only one section of the statute — section 9106 — 
contains a “penalties” provision applicable to the section in 
which it is contained, and § 9121 does not contain any similar 
provision.  But it would render the plain language of CHRIA’s 
general penalties provision nonsensical if we read it to apply 
solely to section 9106.  After all, both sections 9181 and 9183 
refer to violations of “the provisions of this chapter.”  See 1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if 
possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”); id. § 1922(1) 
(“[T]he General Assembly does not intend a result that is 
absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.”). 
 
11  The only Pennsylvania case defendants cite that discusses the 
imposition of punitive damages under CHRIA merely noted in 
remanding the case to the Commonwealth Court that “while our 
case law suggests the Commonwealth may be exempt from the 
imposition of punitive damages, the Commonwealth Court did 
not develop its reasoning concerning the denial of punitive 
damages [in that case], even in light of the terms of the statute 
which provides for such a remedy.”  Hunt v. Pa. State Police of 
Commonwealth, 983 A.2d 627, 639 (Pa. 2009) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  The case on which the Pennsylvania 
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 We thus conclude that CHRIA permits Taha and the 
certified class to pursue their case seeking to impose punitive 
damages against defendants.  Although we are mindful that this 
decision recognizes that punitive damages may be imposed on 
government defendants, we are confident that the District Court 
will ensure that any award of punitive damages, if there is one, 
is reasonable and proportionate to the wrong committed, 
particularly inasmuch as that Court has not yet determined what 
conduct constitutes a “violation” of CHRIA. 
 5.  Predominance 
 Finally, defendants contest the District Court’s 
certification of a punitive damages only class because they 
contend that the consideration of the amount of punitive 
damages to impose “necessarily raise[s] individualized issues,” 
preventing the action from meeting the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  Appellants’ br. at 26.  But the 
Court found after granting partial summary judgment for Taha 
on liability that the only remaining question of fact was whether 
defendants’ actions were “willful,” an issue which 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court relied for its suggestion that government entities 
may be exempt from the imposition of punitive damages 
involved a common law claim based on the alleged breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement.  See City of Phila. Office of 
Hous. & Cmty. Dev. v. AFSCME, 876 A.2d 375 (Pa. 2005).  
Thus, Hunt differs from the case before us because here there is 
targeted legislation primarily regulating the actions of 
government agencies in their management and dissemination of 
criminal history record information and the legislation includes 
an explicit punitive damages provision. 
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“predominates over any individual issues of its potential 
members.”  See J.A. at 9a. 
 Neither Taha nor defendants provide any binding 
authority from the Supreme Court or this Court concerning the 
availability or boundaries of the certification of a class solely for 
the purpose of the imposition of punitive damages.12  The 
District Court did not address this issue, and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure say nothing specifically either prohibitive or 
permissive with respect to this point.  We therefore must 
consider this question by analyzing the “predominance” prong 
of Rule 23(b)(3), on which defendants focus on appeal. 
 A court certifying a class under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3) must “find[] that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”  The Supreme Court has 
explained that: 
An individual question is one where members of a 
proposed class will need to present evidence that 
varies from member to member, while a common 
question is one where the same evidence will 
suffice for each member to make a prima facie 
showing [or] the issue is susceptible to 
generalized, class-wide proof. 
                                                 
12  Rather, they rely on opinions from the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit and nonprecedential opinions, one from the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the rest from 
various district courts.  See Appellants’ br. at 26-30; Appellee’s 
br. at 54-55; Appellants’ reply br. at 31-32. 
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Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “[t]he Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are 
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” 
 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 
2231, 2249 (1997).  To determine this level of cohesion, “the 
predominance requirement focuses on whether essential 
elements of the class’s claims can be proven at trial with 
common, as opposed to individualized, evidence.”  Hayes v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2013).  “The 
predominance requirement applies to damages as well, because 
the efficiencies of the class action mechanism would be negated 
if ‘[q]uestions of individual damage calculations . . . overwhelm 
questions common to the class.’”  In re Modafinil Antitrust 
Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1433 
(2013)). 
 The District Court found that the predominance prong of 
the class action rule had been met because it had “already held 
that the County Defendants improperly published CHRIA 
protected information on the Inmate Lookup Tool” and thus 
“[t]he only question remaining in this case concerns the award 
of punitive damages,” a question that turned on whether 
defendants’ actions in posting the criminal history record 
information were “willful.”  J.A. at 9a.  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he class-wide question of fact as to the 
County Defendants’ willfulness predominates over any 
individual issues of its potential members.”  Id. 
 Defendants argue that the District Court erred because it 
did not examine how the impact of the disclosure could 
undermine the damages calculation on a class-wide basis.  In 
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this regard, we point out that CHRIA does not provide a 
standard punitive damages amount but instead provides for a 
range of damages between $1,000 and $10,000 “for any 
violation.”  § 9183(b)(2).  Under Pennsylvania tort law, “the 
nature and extent of the harm” caused by a defendant is one of 
three factors a fact-finder may consider in determining the 
amount of punitive damages.  Kirkbride, 555 A.2d at 803.  
Defendants contend that the existence of this permissible factor 
— one of several that a fact-finder may consider — dooms the 
class’s ability to meet predominance. 
 However, our core analysis on the predominance issue 
focuses on whether the class can meet the “essential elements” 
of its claims “with common, as opposed to individualized, 
evidence.”  See Hayes, 725 F.3d at 359.  At this stage of the 
proceedings in this case, the only remaining factual issue is 
whether defendants willfully violated CHRIA.  Clearly, the trier 
of fact should be able to determine whether a violation was 
“willful” by considering common evidence regarding 
defendants’ actions and intent without taking into account 
information regarding the individual class members.  After all, 
the class members played no role when defendants released the 
information about them by posting it online.  A determination of 
the “essential element” in this case centers on common acts by 
defendants and perhaps their states of mind.  Because any 
“actual and real” damages suffered by individual class members 
cannot be considered in this case as the class was not certified 
for the purpose of making such determinations, the impact of 
defendants’ actions on individual plaintiffs has no bearing on 
the remaining essential element in this case, i.e., defendants’ 
willfulness.  Therefore, the District Court did not make an error 
when it found that the predominance factor had been met. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s May 4, 2016 order certifying a class in this case. 
